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The question whether to limit or prohibit ritual slaughter or not is one that has been vexing decision-makers in
both politics and law in Europe in recent years. More correctly, the debate is not about banning the practice for
its own sake, but rather the extent to which animal welfare can be advanced without unduly limiting the right to
freedom of religion. Animal welfare in this regard takes the form of stunning animals, thereby attempting to
lessen their suffering while being slaughtered. The cause of tension becomes clear when one considers that
many adherents of Islam and Judaism follow interpretations that question whether the act of stunning is
compatible with religious precepts on how animals ought to be slaughtered.
The Belgian federal region of Flanders is the latest territory where religious exemptions from stunning animals
before slaughter have been scrapped. On 28 June 2017 the Flemish Parliament accepted a regional decree
which provides that all animals must be stunned when slaughtered from 1 January 2019. According to the
decree all such animals must be stunned by means of electrical current. A temporary exemption was made for
bovine animals and calves until such time as electrical means prove to be equally effective in stunning these
animals, too. In passing the decree Flanders follows the Walloon region whose parliament required the blanket
stunning of animals earlier in the year, a decree that will take effect starting in September 2019. This leaves the
Brussels Capitol Region where stunning animals is still exempted for religious reasons. Should the Brussels
region accept a ban too, religious slaughter without stunning will be impossible throughout Belgium.
In analysing the Flemish decree, three critical remarks need to be made in putting the new law into the right legal
perspective. Firstly, the explanatory memorandum accompanying the draft decree argued that scrapping
religious exemptions did not necessarily interfere with the right to freedom of religion in article 9(1) ECHR, as
such meat was still accessible in Flanders and not prohibited by the decree. The effect is to obviate the need for
any limitation analysis in terms of article 9(2) ECHR. This argument was taken from the 2000 judgment of the
European Court of Human Rights in Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek v. France. In this matter no interference was
found, as the applicants could still access meat in France considered suitable by them, incidentally by importing
such meat from Belgium at the time.
This type of reasoning makes for bad law and should consequently be rejected. This is because an excessive
burden is placed on the bearer of article 9(1) ECHR in claiming even elementary protection from state
interference with ritual slaughter practices. Yet, the bearer of the right to freedom of religion should be afforded
maximum protection under the scope of the right, leaving any factual interference with the scope of the right to
be justified by the state in terms of the limitation provision in article 9(2) ECHR. The Court’s reasoning, and by
implication the explanatory memorandum, neutralises the protection of religious freedom with little difficulty. This
negates article 9 ECHR as a real protection mechanism by granting the state a wide field by default. Also,
requiring such a high threshold is not very common in Strasbourg case law, raising the unanswered question
why freedom of religion, and in particular ritual slaughter, is singled out in this manner. The Court’s silence is
probably telling of the awkwardness of its reasoning.
Secondly, the explanatory memorandum does not pay sufficient attention to the severity of the decree’s
interference with article 9(1) ECHR. While in Cha’are Shalom Ve Tsedek the issue concerned the recognition of
one organisation over another in conducting ritual slaughter, the Flemish decree aims to make slaughter without
stunning impossible as such. The effect is to limit a right totally, rather than to limit it partially. A simple reliance
on access to ritually slaughtered meat might not be sufficient enough in justifying such a far-reaching
interference with article 9(1) ECHR. It could be argued that such access should be reasonable, as opposed to
merely formal. In other words, the interference with article 9(1) ECHR would be unjustified to the extent that
access becomes unreasonable. This would be the case for instance if the Brussels region would copy the
Flemish and Walloon decrees, or the price of importing meat to Belgium would become excessive. Not only
would a reasonableness requirement improve the protection of freedom of religion, but it would also help to
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ensure the equal protection of religious adherents affected by the decree in a material fashion. A less restrictive
avenue could also have been to only allow a religious exemption for meat to be consumed nationally, as
opposed to meat destined for export. Shifting the focus from the Strasbourg Court to the Luxembourg Court for a
moment, the severity of the decree’s interference could very well also raise questions under the requirement in
article 52(1) of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU that the ‘essence’ of a right, such as that to freedom
of religion in article 10, may not be limited.
Thirdly, curiously the decree stipulates that if an animal is slaughtered in terms of religious rites, any stunning
must be reversible and may not lead to the animal’s death. The effect is for a secular decree to codify a religious
practice. This oversteps the separation between the state and religion, which is a principle of the Belgian state
and by implication of the Flemish region. While the Flemish Parliament may in principle legislate on whether
animals should be stunned or not when slaughtered, with possible implications for freedom of religion, it may not
prescribe the form a religious practice should take.
The purpose of the Flemish decree, namely the advancement of animal welfare, is without doubt legitimate and
laudable. Yet, the extent and manner to which the decree pursues this aim is not entirely beyond legal doubt
when measured against the right to freedom of religion and the separation of state and religion. These doubts
expose a well-meaning decree to legal challenge and unnecessary uncertainty.
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